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A Rhetorical Revolution: The Antithesis of the First
Amendment
Eimi Priddis Yildirim*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”1 Through the years, these words have been the focal point
of intense controversy. A variety of interpretations of the constitutionally mandated church-state relationship they describe have
emerged, each purporting to be the most accurate version of what
they require. However, none of these interpretations has proven entirely satisfactory. Even the Supreme Court has been unable to settle
the issue.2 Instead, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has gained a
reputation for being “inconsistent and at times incomprehensible,”3
“historically counterfactual” and “haphazard.”4 Andrew Koppelman
summed it up like this: “[There is] a [large] consensus that the American law of religious liberty makes no sense. It has been called ‘unprincipled, incoherent, and unworkable,’ ‘a disaster,’ ‘in serious disarray,’ ‘chaotic, controversial, and unpredictable,’ ‘in shambles,’
‘schizoid,’ and ‘a complete hash.’”5
* Affiliate of the Center for Constitutional Studies at Utah Valley University and Adjunct Professor of English at Brigham Young University. BA., M.A., J.D., Brigham Young University. I would like to extend tremendous thanks to Rodney K. Smith and Patrick A. Shea for
their valuable feedback, as well as for their guidance and encouragement. Special thanks as well
to Elder Dallin H. Oaks for his feedback and support, and to numerous others who reviewed
drafts or gave feedback after presentations. Thanks to Cole Durham for help with early drafts.
Thanks to Janet Lawrence, Kristy Gale, Eric Jensen, and Brett McInelly for making this possible. Heartfelt thanks to my parents and siblings and husband, my first and most
cherished critics.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011) (dissenting
from denial of certiorari and describing Establishment Clause jurisprudence as “in shambles,”
“nebulous,” and “anyone’s guess”).
3. William P. Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 925, 928 (1986).
4. Frank Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial Philosophy: Originalism and the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 357 (1993).
5. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 4 (2013).
See also MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2 (2013)
(“[S]cholars of religious liberty have criticized both the direction and coherence of the law. . . .
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Due to this state of affairs, some have begun to argue that there is
“no grand unified theory for deciding [church and state] cases.”6
However, more careful attention and fidelity to the text of the Establishment Clause reveals that there is a clearer solution. Careful attention to the text reveals that one possible interpretation of the Establishment Clause has until now been entirely overlooked. This
interpretation—an alternative syntactic interpretation of the Establishment Clause in which respecting is viewed as a verb instead of a
preposition—has the ability to solve many of the contradictions and
problems that beset Establishment Clause jurisprudence today.
The purpose of this article is to explain and defend this alternative syntactic interpretation. To that end, Part II will first review the
previously proposed Establishment Clause interpretations and the
difficulties with each. Part III will introduce the alternative interpretation—a new syntactic paradigm—through linguistic analysis. It will
also include a discussion of the evidence in favor of adopting this particular interpretation. Part IV will examine the implications of the interpretation and demonstrate how the interpretation would improve
and clarify the law of religious freedom. Part V will summarize and
conclude the discussion.
II. INTERPRETING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Scholars, judges, lawyers, and laymen have tried for years to elucidate the meaning of the Establishment Clause. The result has been
the advancement of numerous theories regarding the proper interpretation of the Clause. The prevailing theories of interpretation can,
however, be divided roughly into three camps: non-preferentialism,
separationism, and neutrality.7 Each has its own set of principles, and
its own set of problems, which will be discussed briefly below.

Disaffection for their own field, one might say, is unique in uniting them.”). In addition, a quick
perusal of religion clause cases on Lexisnexis.com will quickly betray that nearly every case indicates possible negative treatment.
6. Associated Press, Retired Supreme Court Justice O’Connor Visits Charleston, LIVE
5 NEWS (June 30, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://www.live5news.com/story/21984911/retiredsupreme-court-justice-oconnor-visits-charleston/. See also DEGIROLAMI, supra note 5 at 1-2;
Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363,
372-76 (2015).
7. Another potential category that was considered is termed “accommodationism.”
However, the author considers that, fundamentally, accommodationism is another variety of
non-preferentialism. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should It Be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected?, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 513, 548 (1990).
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A. Non-preferentialism

One early interpretation of the Establishment Clause, nonpreferentialism, can be summed up like this: “government may not
prefer one religion over others, but it may aid all religions evenhandedly.”8 A more specific derivative of this view is that the Establishment Clause was intended only to prevent the establishment of one
national church, a national church being the quintessential expression
of preferring one religion over another. Regardless of the specific iteration, non-preferentialism has been conclusively and repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court.9 Although a strong minority has always
promoted it,10 the interpretation does have flaws.
One of the flaws of non-preferentialism is that it countenances
any government financial aid for religious organizations if nonpreferentially distributed, and, as a result, the government can, under
the doctrine, compel citizens to finanically support religious creeds
that violate their conscience. Such a situation seems to contradict the
principles espoused by the Founders and the drafters of the First
Amendment, especially James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who,
when drafting Virginia’s Act for Establishing Religious Freedom,
boldly declared
that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his
own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor whose morals
he would make his pattern . . . .11

Virginia’s Act for Establishing Religious Freedom was, in fact, written in opposition to a proposed non-preferential religious taxation
8. Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 877 (1986).
9. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1961) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a church; it forbade all laws
respecting an establishment of religion.”) (emphasis added); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (“[T]his Court has rejected unequivocally the contention
that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion
over another.”)
10. Some of the proponents include the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist and professors Robert Cord, Rodney K. Smith, and Michael Malbin.
11. “A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,” enacted by the General Assembly of
Virginia, January 19, 1786; 12 HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE 84 (1823). See also
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (circa June
20, 1785).
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bill, which would have allowed the government in Virginia to tax its
citizens in order to provide government financial support to all religious denominations on an equal basis. Clearly, Madison, the primary author of the Bill of Rights, was opposed to this kind of nonpreferential aid, and it would, therefore, defy reason to think that the
Establishment Clause, which in part evolved out of Virginia’s Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom, was meant to allow it.
Another crucial flaw of non-preferentialism is perhaps more significant—that the financial mingling between the government and
religious organizations that non-preferentialism allows is detrimental
to religious organizations. When religious organizations become reliant on government funds, the government can control the organizations by setting conditions for the granting of funds or by penalizing
through the withdrawal of funds. Consequently, religious organizations may be forced to choose between needed funding or a compromise of religious character and principles.
The negative effect on religious organizations of permissive financial mingling with the government was seen in the widespread
loss of religious character by some religious institutions of higher education in the United States during the last century. The case of
Tilton v. Richardson12 provides one example. In the case, taxpayers
challenged the granting of federal funds to four Catholic universities.
Though the universities eventually won the lawsuit and retained the
funds, “[d]uring the three-year course of the Tilton litigation, the
four colleges were methodically secularized to meet the challenge of
the lawsuit.”13 One of the universities made significant changes, like
removing crucifixes from classrooms, removing religious references from school charters and corporate seals, and having the members of the university’s governing board give up their religious offices.14 A commentator, when analyzing the effects of the case,
knowingly noted that “government frequently exacts a price for the
aid that it provides.”15

12. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
13. Joseph Richard Preville, Catholic Colleges and the Supreme Court: The Case of
Tilton v. Richardson, 30 J. CHURCH & ST. 291, 306 (1988).
14. Id.
15. CHARLES H. WILSON, JR., TILTON V. RICHARDSON: THE SEARCH FOR
SECTARIANISM IN EDUCATION, 50 (1971).
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B. Separationism

Separationism—the view that government should be prohibited
from “aiding religion in any form”16—is perhaps the most prevalent
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In 1947, as part of the
ongoing incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court heard its first significant Establishment Clause case, Everson v. Board of Education.17 In
this case, the Court authoritatively defined the meaning of the Establishment Clause for the first time, and it did so in the language of
separation.18 Following Everson, separationism became the governing
principle of Establishment Clause adjudication for many years,19 justifying, among other things, the removal of prayer,20 Bible reading,21
and religious instruction22 from schools.
In spite of its early widespread acceptance, the separationist view
also has problems. First, it is unworkable practically, which has been
acknowledged repeatedly in Establishment Clause cases;23 second, it
16. Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism in Establishment Clause Analysis: A Response
to Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 245, 248 (1991).
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Before incorporation of the Establishment Clause in 1947, the
Supreme Court had heard only two Establishment Clause cases: Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S.
291 (1899), and Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
18. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-18 (“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’”).
Some have argued that Everson, though speaking broadly of separationism, did not actually
stand for the separationist principle. After all, the holding of the case was that the government
could fund public bus transportation to parochial schools. See, e.g., W. COLE DURHAM &
BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 133 (2010). See also Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity
of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 56 (1997) (arguing that what the Supreme
Court has called separationism has really been a version of neutrality, and that even “[t]he
Lemon test, the very symbol of strict separation, itself began as an elaboration of neutrality.”).
19. Its influence continued with the Supreme Court into the 1980s.
20. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
21. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
22. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
23. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (“The First Amendment, however,
does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. . . .
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other—hostile, suspicious, and even
unfriendly.”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) (“No perfect or absolute
separation is really possible: the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of
sorts . . . .”); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (“[T]otal separation is not possible
in an absolute sense.”); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
760 (1973) (“[T]his Nation’s history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between
Church and State. It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of
total separation . . . .”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (“No significant segment
of our society and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation
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creates hostility toward religion, contradicting the protections guaranteed in the Free Exercise Clause;24 third, it is difficult to reconcile
with the actions of the Founders, who openly engaged in religious
practices;25 and finally, it seems to represent a misinterpretation of
the metaphor that gave the idea its legitimacy.
In relation to the final point, as noted in Everson, the “wall of
separation” metaphor that led to the separationist idea was actually
borrowed from Thomas Jefferson,26 who used the phrase in a letter
he wrote to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802.27 Thomas Jefferson was not the first to speak of the “wall of separation” however,
but was likely alluding to the words of Roger Williams, a founder of
the Baptist church.28 Williams wrote:
[W]hen they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation
between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world,
God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick,
and made his garden a wilderness, as at this day. And that there fore
if He will eer please to restore His garden and paradise again,
it must of necessity be walled in peculiarly unto Himself from
the world.29

Williams spoke of a “wall of separation” that was to surround and
protect the church, which is rather different than the wall we speak of

from all the other parts, much less from the government. . . . Nor does the Constitution require
complete separation of church and state . . . .”).
24. See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Dallin
H. Oaks, Separation, Accommodation and the Future of Church and State, 35 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 2 (1985) (“The prohibition against establishment seems to forbid government support
for religion, but the guarantee of free exercise seems to compel the very same support.”).
25. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674-75 (enumerating numerous examples of “an unbroken
history of official acknowledgement by all three branches of government of the role of religion
in American life from at least 1789”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (providing numerous additional examples).
26. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
27. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (“Believing with you that religion
is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for
his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and
not opinions,—I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between church
and State.”). Note that Jefferson referred to the “wall of separation” as a function of both religion clauses, not only the Establishment Clause.
28. JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE FAITH OF OUR
FOUNDING FATHERS 243 (1987).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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now: “Today the metaphor has been stood on its head, and the wall is
thought to protect the state from the church.”30
What is more, Roger Williams’ metaphor is actually itself an allusion. It comprises an indirect reference to a biblical passage,31 in
which an author metaphorically relates how religion must be walled
in from the secular realm to preserve its distinctiveness and protect it
from corruption.32 Understanding this context and history behind the
metaphor reveals that Jefferson’s allusion has been misconstrued under the separationist view. Even more, it reveals an interesting irony:
because the very phrase “separation of church and state” is in fact an
allusion to the Bible, under the separationist interpretation, the very
concept of separation itself would be banned.

C. Neutrality
For a long time, the debate about the interpretation of the Establishment Clause chiefly pitted non-preferentialists against separationists. However, in time, a third category of interpretation began to
compete for recognition: neutrality. Though other more nuanced
definitions have been proposed,33 fundamentally, neutrality encompasses the idea that
[t]he [Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause] should be
read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read
together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.34

30. Id.
31. Isaiah 5:2, 5 (“And he fenced it, and gathered out the stones thereof, and planted it
with the choicest vine, and built a tower in the midst of it, and also made a winepress therein:
and he looked that it should bring forth grapes, and it brought forth wild grapes. . . . And now
go to; I will tell you what I will do to my vineyard: I will take away the hedge thereof, and it
shall be eaten up; and break down the wall thereof, and it shall be trodden down.”). See also
PHILLIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 44 (2004).
32. EIDSMOE, supra note 28, at 243 (“According to Williams, the ‘wall of separation’ was
to protect the ‘garden of the church’ from the ‘wilderness of the world.’ Today the metaphor
has been stood on its head, and the wall is thought to protect the state from the church.”).
33. Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51 (2007);
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).
34. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 96 (1961). See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation to Judeo-Christian Tolerance, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691, 691 (2010).
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Beginning in the 1980s,35 when separationism began to decline in influence, the Supreme Court embraced neutrality instead.36
As with non-preferentialism and separationism, there are also
problems with neutrality. First of all, neutrality is not in fact neutral.
That is because the nature of neutrality37 is that it can only be defined
“by reference to other principles (which are not neutral).”38 For example, neutrality between all religions, neutrality between all Christian religions, and neutrality between religion and nonreligion are all
equally versions of neutrality—they just have different points of reference. The selection of the points of reference betrays an inevitable
bias. In relation to the Establishment Clause, the neutrality spoken of
“mandates governmental neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion,”39 and therefore, “[l]urking underneath the Court’s ‘formal
neutrality’ doctrine is the notion that religion has no special status,
and thus there is no need to differentiate between religion and nonreligion . . . .”40 This is not a neutral position, nor is it a foregone
conclusion in the religion clause debate.
Other problems with neutrality include that it is oftentimes impossible for the government to be perfectly neutral between religion
and nonreligion.41 Furthermore, the very mention of religion in the
35. Gedicks, supra note 34, at 695; Laycock, supra note 18, at 52.
36. Gedicks, supra note 34, at 695. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
37. As virtues, neutrality and equality have no moral content of themselves. For example,
there is no virtue in being equal if everyone is equally poor, equally hungry, or equally miserable. There is no virtue in maintaining neutrality if it means failing to support a morally superior
position. These concepts derive their value only in relation to other virtues.
38. Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 499 (2004). See also
Chad Flanders, Can We Please Stop Talking About Neutrality? Koppelman Between Scalia
and Rawls, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1139, 1141-42 (2013); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
96-97 (1995).
39. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). See also McCreary Cty. v. ACLU,
545 U.S. 844, 889 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. Ravitch, supra note 38, at 501.
41. Id. at 496-97; Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305
(1990); Bruce Ledewitz, Toward a Meaning-full Establishment Clause Neutrality, 87 CHI.KENT L. REV. 725, 736 (2012); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 146, 151, 164-65 (1986). See also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U.S. 460 (2009). This is particularly true in the context of the courts, which are part of an adversary system, where in cases of real conflict a winner and a loser must be chosen in every instance. What kind of court declares at the end of a case that their intent is to maintain a neutral
stance between the two sides? Yet is this not what the Court has tried to do with neutrality in
the religious freedom realm? As King Solomon of old wisely understood, if you try to split the
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First Amendment, let alone its protected status, seems to advocate a
nonneutral stance towards religion.42 Finally, the problems encountered with non-preferentialism and separationism—financially mingling government and religion43 and contradicting the actions of the
Founders regarding religious practices44—remain. In fact, it seems
that neutrality, rather than striking a perfect balance between nonpreferentialism and separationism, actually only perpetuates the
problems of both, while also adding problems of its own.
III. A NEW SYNTACTIC PARADIGM
The theoretical and practical problems inherent in each of the
prevailing Establishment Clause interpretations have made most
judges unwilling to pursue any one theory to its logical extreme, leading instead to the confusing web of contradictions, exceptions, and
irregularities that presently plagues religion clause jurisprudence.
However, the situation is not irredeemable. A return to the text of
the Establishment Clause, and a more careful analysis of the
words, reveals that there is a solution. The solution is an alternative
syntactic interpretation of the Establishment Clause that has, until
now, been entirely overlooked. This alternative interpretation resolves the problems inherent in each of the current prevailing interpretations. This section introduces, through linguistic analysis, this
alternative interpretation of the Establishment Clause, as well as the
abundance of evidence in support of its theoretical soundness and its
historical accuracy.

baby, nobody is happy.
42. McConnell, supra note 41, at 148 (“Protections for religious liberty are no more
‘neutral’ toward religion than freedom of the press is ‘neutral’ toward the press.”). See also
Oaks, supra note 24, at 8; Flanders, supra note 38, at 1147.
43. Religious organizations can receive funding if on an equal basis with nonreligious
organizations. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (approving the use of
government scholarships in private religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
(allowing the loan of educational materials to private religious schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997) (allowing public school teachers to teach in private religious schools).
44. Religious symbols are tolerated only if balanced by nonreligous symbols. See, e.g.,
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). An exception to separationism, ceremonial deism, allowed religious symbols to remain based on the theory that they had lost religious significance
through time, although retaining historical and cultural value. A second rationale based in neutrality, sometimes called “the reindeer rule,” grants amnesty to symbols understood to be religious if balanced out by an adequate number of secular symbols. See Gedicks, supra note 34, at
697-99.
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A. Semantic Ambiguity: Textual Justifications for the Establishment
Clause Interpretations
It is a wonder, but advocates of non-preferentialism, separationism, and neutrality all find support for their positions in the text of
the Establishment Clause. The fact that the Establishment Clause has
been interpreted in so many different ways is mostly due to a semantic ambiguity45 within the text. More specifically, proponents of each
of the interpretations have found different ways of interpreting the
phrase an establishment of religion. The difference in their interpretations has led to the divergence of their doctrines.
Non-preferentialists interpret an establishment of religion to
mean something akin to “an officially recognized and supported
church . . . .”46 This interpretation grew out of the pervasiveness of
what Steven Smith calls the “civil peace rationale” for religious freedom—that “the Framers opted for religious freedom as a way of
avoiding the civil turmoil [caused] by the religious wars in Europe
and by the civil wars that divided England”47—a rationale that is still
“probably the most commonly articulated justification for religious
freedom in modern legal discourse.”48 If, as this rationale suggests,
the Founders were primarily concerned with preventing the tyranny
of established churches like those of Europe,49 then an establishment
of religion would naturally refer to the European model of an “officially recognized and supported church . . . .”50 This is the interpretation of an establishment of religion that the non-preferentialists have
45. The semantic ambiguity could, in fact, more accurately be characterized as a syntactic ambiguity. “An establishment of religion” is an ambiguous phrase due to the dual syntax of
the word “establishment.” “Establishment” can be a verbal noun, leading to the paraphrase “establishing religion,” or a deverbal, leading to the paraphrases “established religion” or “religious establishment.” However, because the ambiguity involves two alternative meanings of a
phrase, I have characterized it here as a semantic ambiguity for simplicity in explaining.
46. Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 121 (2008)
[hereinafter Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution]. There is evidence that “officially recognized
and supported church[es]” were commonly called “establishments” at the time. Id. at 121. See
Madison, supra note 11 (“[E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.”).
47. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 163 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, The Rise and Fall of
Religious Freedom].
48. Id.
49. The early American colonies and states also had established churches. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2107 (2003).
50. Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, supra note 46, at 121.
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adopted. Because, in their view, a prohibition against an establishment of religion prevents only a state established church, there is
nothing wrong with supporting religions impartially.
On the other hand, those supporting either separationism or neutrality usually interpret an establishment of religion differently.51
Generally, they interpret establishment, not in its nominal sense, but
in its verbal sense, meaning “giving official recognition and support.”52 In addition, religion is not understood to be a “church” or
any other specific organized group of believers, but is interpreted literally, as Justice Souter has explained:
What is remarkable is that, unlike the earliest House drafts or the
final Senate proposal, the prevailing language is not limited to laws
respecting an establishment of “a religion,” “a national religion,”
“one religious sect,” or specific “articles of faith.” The Framers repeatedly considered and deliberately rejected such narrow language
and instead extended their prohibition to state support for “religion” in general.53

In other words, proponents of separationism or neutrality interpret
the word religion in an establishment of religion broadly so as to include any and all religion. Thus, they interpret the Establishment
Clause to mean that the government cannot “officially recognize or
support” religion in general—not just a religion,54 but all religion.55
51. There are those who adhere to separationism or neutrality who do also interpret an
establishment of religion to mean “an officially recognized and supported church.” These, then,
come to separationism or neutrality based on a broad interpretation of the word respecting. By
interpreting respecting loosely as “having anything to do with,” such that the Religion Clauses
prevent any law “having anything to do with an officially recognized and supported church,”
they reach a separationist or neutrality conclusion, based upon the logic that even the smallest
intimation of support for any religion is the first step on a slippery slope to an established
church. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“The language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best opaque, particularly when compared with other
portions of the Amendment. Its authors did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state
church or a state religion, an area history shows they regarded as very important and fraught
with great dangers. Instead they commanded that there should be ‘no law respecting an establishment of religion.’ A law may be one ‘respecting’ the forbidden objective while falling short
of its total realization. . . . A given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be
one ‘respecting’ that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment . . . .”) (emphasis added).
52. See Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, supra note 46, at 121.
53. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 614–15 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
54. There are in fact those who speak of the Establishment Clause as forbidding “establishing a religion.” See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“The Establishment
Clause . . . is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion . . . .”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 89 (1985) (“[O]ur duty is to determine whether the statue or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion.”). But this is not a viable syntactic in-
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Though the proponents of the different church and state theories
disagree about the correct resolution of this semantic ambiguity in
the Establishment Clause, they do share a similar syntactic understanding of the Establishment Clause. For example, in the clause
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
each side views Congress as the subject, shall make as the verb, no
law as the direct object, and respecting an establishment of religion as
a prepositional phrase modifying law. What is most significant about
the unified understanding of the syntax is that all sides have interpreted the word respecting as a preposition. This is demonstrated in
the following two quotes, taken from proponents of nonpreferentialism and separationism. The proponent of nonpreferentialism has stated: “The word ‘respecting,’ which is synonymous with ‘concerning, regarding, about, anent,’ indicates that the
First Amendment did not prohibit an establishment of religion; rather it prohibited Congress from making any law about, concerning,
or regarding an establishment of religion.”56
If respecting is understood to mean “concerning, regarding,
about, anent”—all synonymous prepositions—it can easily be seen
that respecting has been interpreted in its prepositional sense. This is
further apparent in the description of the function of the word respecting in the argument of the proponent of separationism:
A law may be one “respecting” the forbidden objective while falling
short of its total realization. A law “respecting” the proscribed result, that is, the establishment of religion, is not always easily identifiable as one violative of the Clause. A given law might not establish
a state religion but nevertheless be one “respecting” that end in the
sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment and
hence offend the First Amendment.57

Interpreting respecting as “potentially leading to” is, again, interpreting respecting according to its prepositional definition.
In other words, the two semantic interpretations of the Establishment Clause advocated now, both acknowledging respecting as a
terpretation of the Establishment Clause, given that there is no a before the word religion in
the text.
55. For separationists, that means that the government cannot be entangled with religion
in any way; for those supporting neutrality, it means that religion and irreligion must be treated
equally.
56. ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 9 (1982).
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (emphasis added).
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preposition, but disagreeing about the semantic meaning of an establishment of religion, could be paraphrased like this: (1) Congress
shall make no law with regards to an officially recognized or supported church; or (2) Congress shall make no law with regards to officially recognizing or supporting religion.

B. Syntactic Ambiguity: An Alternative Syntactic Interpretation
Looking closely at the language of the Establishment Clause reveals that there is not only semantic ambiguity in the words, but that,
in spite of the unified syntactic understanding forwarded by those on
all sides of the debate, there is in fact a syntactic ambiguity as well.
Though there have been endless debates about the proper semantic
understanding of the clause, the syntactic ambiguity has been entirely
overlooked. Recognizing the syntactic ambiguity, however, leads to a
completely new way of understanding the Establishment Clause.
The syntactic ambiguity in the Establishment Clause revolves
around the word respecting. As discussed in the previous section,
proponents of every side in the Establishment Clause debate assume
that respecting is a preposition. Nevertheless, respecting is not always
necessarily a preposition. It actually has a number of possible syntactic functions. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, at the
time that the Establishment Clause was written, there were various
definitions of the word respecting in use (as there are now). Respecting could be at least a noun, an adjective, a preposition, or a verb in
the present participial form.58 A careful analysis of the Establishment
Clause text reveals, accordingly, that in this particular syntactical
context, respecting could actually be interpreted as a verb.
If respecting were understood to be a verb, rather than meaning
“concerning, about, with regards to,”59 it would mean something
more along the lines of “to take cognizance of,” or “to regard with
deference.”60 Furthermore, if respecting were understood in its verbal
sense, the syntax and meaning of the Establishment Clause would
change. Although Congress would still be the subject, shall make
would still be the verb, and no law would still be the direct object, respecting an establishment of religion would be, not a prepositional
phrase, but a participial phrase modifying the word law. This subtle
58. Respecting, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2016).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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syntactic shift from prepositional to participial phrase is significant. If
respecting is a participial verb within a participial phrase, it follows
that an establishment of religion is not the object of a preposition,
but rather the recipient of the action of the participial verb respecting. Consequently, an establishment could not be a verbal noun,
meaning “to establish,” but it would instead necessarily and unambiguously be a deverbal noun,61 meaning a thing in “the state of being
established.”62 As a result, an establishment of religion would no
longer be semantically ambiguous. Rather, an establishment of religion63 would be revealed to mean clearly “a religion that is
established,”64 or, more simply, “a religious organization or a
religious group.”65
61. Deverbal nouns are nouns that are formed from verbs, but that behave grammatically
purely as nouns. “Establishment” can generally be a verbal noun, paraphrased as “the act of establishing,” or a deverbal noun, paraphrased as “the state of being established.” Compare with
the phrase, “collection of stamps,” which could mean either “collecting of stamps” or “stamp
collection.” However, in this context, if “respecting” is a verb, “establishment” cannot be a verbal noun. It would create a nonsensical phrase with no clear meaning (especially because there
would be two verbs in sequence). Therefore, viewing “respecting” as a verb clears up the ambiguity in the phrase “an establishment of religion.”
62. Establishment MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
establishment (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
63. One concern some might suggest with adopting the syntax of the Establishment
Clause proposed here involves the historical meaning of the word establishment. It is clear that
at the time of the drafting that the term establishment was at times used to refer to a state religion. See e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). It therefore might seem
likely that when the Founders wrote the Establishment Clause, the word establishment was selected as a term of art, referring to this particular meaning. However, the evidence shows that
establishment was also commonly used in other senses as well. In fact, within James Madison’s
famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, other meanings of establishment were used. For example, the document argues against “A Bill establishing a provision
for Teachers of the Christian Religion.” When Madison said that “the establishment proposed
by the Bill is not requisite for the support of the Christian Religion,” what did establishment
refer to? A state church? No, it refers to the established provision for Teachers of the Christian
Religion. When he used establishment to refer to a state church, it was usually preceded by a
modifier, such as ecclesiastical. See Madison, supra note 11. Furthermore, Madison, when vetoing as President, “An act incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia,” said that the bill “violates, in particular, the article of the
Constitution . . . which declares, that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment’” and because “[t]he bill affects into, and establishes by law, sundry rules and proceedings relative purely to the organization and polity of the church incorporated,” that “[t]his particular church therefore, would so far be a religious establishment by law.” Notice that he
paraphrased an establishment of religion with the structure a religious establishment. Notice as
well that, in saying that the church would be “a religious establishment by law,” he did not
speak of being a state church, but rather of being a legal entity with religious tenants controlled
by law. See The Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United States. Eleventh Congress, Third Session. Printed and Published by Gales and Seaton, pp. 982-983 (1853).
64. The prohibition of the Establishment Clause has been paraphrased in the past with
phrases like “the establishment of religion” or “establishing a religion.” These paraphrases are
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In other words, if respecting were a verb, the Establishment
Clause would not be paraphrased as Congress shall make no law with
regards to (1) an officially recognized or supported church, or (2) officially recognizing or supporting religion. Instead, it would be paraphrased more like this: (3) Congress shall make no law showing regard for a religious organization.

C. Support for the Alternative Syntactic Interpretation
Adopting this alternative syntactic reading of the Establishment
Clause, where respecting is understood to be a participial verb, will
require a significant paradigm shift. However, there is a great deal of
evidence in support of accepting this proposed interpretation. In fact,
even though the more traditional syntactic interpretation of the Establishment Clause has been entrenched in the law, the evidence
shows that the interpretation proposed here must certainly have been
what the Founders originally intended.

1. The Late Modern English Period
To understand the evidence in favor of this alternative interpretation, it is first helpful to consider the time period during which the
Establishment Clause was written. The Constitution and Bill of
Rights were written near the beginning of the Late Modern English
(LME) period, which started in roughly 1700 A.D. The LME period
followed upon the heels of the Early Modern English (EME) period,
which extended from 1500-1700 A.D.66 During the EME period,
which is characterized by the works of Shakespeare and the King
James Version of the Bible,67 English was transforming from a “bar-

inaccurate and grammatically impossible. Furthermore, in the case that respecting is a verb,
“establishing religion” would also be inaccurate. A paraphrase like “respecting a religious establishment” would be more appropriate in the case that respecting is a verb.
65. An establishment of religion, even when establishment must be understood to be a
deverbal noun, still has two ambiguous meanings. In the deverbal sense, an establishment of
religion may be paraphrased as “a religious establishment” or “an established religion.” This
could mean either “an officially recognized or supported church” or “a religious organization.”
However, it is redundant and nonsensical to speak of respecting an officially recognized or supported church. Therefore, there is only one other plausible meaning: respecting a religious organization. Therefore, understanding respecting as a verb clarifies any potential ambiguities.
66. CHARLES BARBER, EARLY MODERN ENGLISH 1 (2d ed. 1997). These dates are
rough estimations. Some argue that Early Modern English extended until 1750 or 1800 A.D.
See, e.g., ROB PENHALLURICK, STUDYING THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 29 (2d ed. 2010).
67. MARIO PEI, THE STORY OF ENGLISH 66-70 (1952).
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barous” or “vulgar” language to an “eloquent” language.68 A language
was considered eloquent if it was, among other things,
adorned with the devices of classical rhetoric.69 Therefore, rhetoric
was studied dutifully.70
The eighteenth century, or the beginning of the LME period,
was characterized by “attempt[s] to regulate the [English] language.”71 There was “a growing feeling that English needed to be
‘ruled,’”72 a ruled language being “one in which acceptable usage is
explicitly laid down, for example by grammars and dictionaries . . . .”73 Therefore, “[t]he eighteenth century brought the first really comprehensive dictionaries of English, and an enormous number
of English grammars, especially in the second half of the century.”74
Famous works of the eighteenth century include the grammar written
by Robert Lowth75 and the dictionary by Samuel Johnson.76 Noah
Webster’s dictionary followed very soon thereafter in the beginning
of the nineteenth century.77 In other words, the time during which
the Founders wrote the Constitution and Bill of Rights was a time
during which people were preoccupied with grammar and rhetoric. A
middle class was rising, and one way to distinguish oneself as ranked
among the higher and educated class was through eloquent language—through proper speaking and etiquette.78
The Founders were among the most educated men in America
when they drafted the Establishment Clause. They were, therefore,
certainly influenced by the linguistic atmosphere of the times. The
experience of James Madison, the primary author of the Bill of
Rights, for example, shows this to be true. Madison attended the Col-

68. BARBER, supra note 67, at 1, 52.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 71 (“The first three subjects of the traditional [school] curriculum were grammar, rhetoric, and logic . . . .”).
71. CHARLES BARBER, JOAN C. BEAL & PHILIP A. SHAW, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE:
A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 215 (2d ed. 2012).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. ROBERT LOWTH, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH GRAMMAR (1762).
76. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755).
77. Webster’s first dictionary was published in 1806.
78. RAYMOND HICKEY, ATTITUDES AND CONCERNS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLISH, IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH: IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE 1, 160 (Raymond
Hickey ed. 2010). See also DENNIS FREEBORN, FROM OLD ENGLISH TO STANDARD
ENGLISH: A COURSE BOOK IN LANGUAGE VARIATION ACROSS TIME 389 (2d ed. 1998).
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lege of New Jersey (later Princeton). While there, he came under the
tutelage of John Witherspoon, who was a signer of the Declaration of
Independence, the president of the college,79 and—a rhetorician.
At the time, Witherspoon wrote and delivered a series of lectures
entitled the Lectures on Eloquence,80 after the manner of which
Madison would have been educated.81 Built upon the principle that
“[e]loquence is undoubtedly a very noble art, and when possessed in a
high degree, has been . . . one of the most admired and envied talents,”82 the lectures proceeded to discuss “the arts of writing and
speaking . . . attempt[ing] to describe the various kinds of composition, their characters, distinctions, beauties, blemishes, the means of
attaining skill in them, and the uses to which they should be applied.”83 In the course of sixteen lectures, Witherspoon addressed
topics such as the arrangement of clauses within a sentence,84 rhetorical figures, 85 organization,86 and rhetorical styles.87 Furthermore, the
lectures admonished,
Be careful to acquaint yourselves well, and to be as perfect as possible in the branches that are subordinate to the study of eloquence . . . the grammar, orthography, and punctuation of the English language. It is not uncommon to find orators of considerable
name, both in the pulpit and at the bar, far from being accurate in
point of grammar. This is evidently a very great blemish.88

Exposed to such lessons, Madison would have learned to take a deliberate approach toward the use of proper grammar and rhetoric. The
other Founders would have been similarly educated.
Understanding this background adds something to the Establishment Clause debate. It is certain, given the linguistic atmosphere
of the time, that Madison and the other drafters of the Constitution
and Bill of Rights would have taken pains to ensure that their most

79. S. Michael Halloran, John Witherspoon on Eloquence, RHETORIC SOC’Y Q., Spring
1987, at 177.
80. JOHN WITHERSPOON & JOHN RODGERS, THE WORKS OF THE REV. JOHN
WITHERSPOON 475-592 (William W. Woodward, 2d ed. 1802).
81. Halloran, supra note 79.
82. WITHERSPOON, supra note 80, at 475.
83. Id. at 381.
84. Id. at 551.
85. Id. at 503, 522–28.
86. Id. at 542–49.
87. Id. at 511.
88. Id. at 489.
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important of texts would be grammatically proper and rhetorically
powerful. Incidentally, as will be demonstrated, the alternative syntactic interpretation suggested here—interpreting the word respecting as a verb—is the most grammatically accurate and rhetorically
appealing interpretation of the Establishment Clause.

2. Grammatical articles
As discussed previously, non-preferentialists, separationists, and
supporters of neutrality dispute the proper resolution of a semantic
ambiguity in the Establishment Clause. In fact, one important cause
of the ambiguity is actually a grammatical question concerning articles. Specifically, both sides have commented, in support of their respective positions, on the seemingly peculiar use (or non-use) of the
articles in the phrase an establishment of religion. Proponents of
non-preferentialism have pointed out the oddity of interpreting the
Establishment Clause as banning support for all religion because of
the choice of the article an rather than the article the proceeding the
word establishment:
Had the framers prohibited “the establishment of religion,” which
would have emphasized the generic word “religion,” there might
have been some reason for thinking they wanted to prohibit all official preferences of religion over irreligion. But by choosing “an establishment” over “the establishment,” they were showing that they
wanted to prohibit only those official activities that tended to promote the interests of one or another particular sect.89

A proponent of separationism, Justice Souter, on the other hand, has
recognized the oddity of interpreting the Establishment Clause as
prohibiting only the establishment of a national church because of
the lack of the article a before the word religion. As he explained in a
previously cited quotation, “the prevailing language is not limited to
laws respecting an establishment of ‘a religion,’ ‘a national religion,’ ‘one religious sect,’ or specific ‘articles of faith.’ The Framers . . . instead extended their prohibition to state support for ‘religion’ in general.”90
Both sides make valid points, which seem irreconcilable. However, interpreting respecting as a verb properly resolves this grammati89. MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE
AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 14-15 (1978) cited in CORD, supra note 56, at 11.
90. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 614–15 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
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cal conundrum. If respecting is a verb, the use of the article an before
establishment makes sense, as does the lack of an article before religion. The use of the article an, not the, before establishment would
properly indicate that no particular religious institution—no one of
many—should be respected. The lack of the article a before religion
would also properly indicate the inclusion of all religions in that
group of many. In other words, an establishment is indeed specific as
non-preferentialists say, and religion is also generic as Justice Souter
proposes, but this is not a contradiction. Rather, the whole phrase, an
establishment of religion, addresses any one specific establishment,
organization, or institution of any and all religion.
Interpreting respecting as a verb, therefore, resolves what would
otherwise seems like a clumsy ambiguity and establishes the kind of
grammatical accuracy that would be expected, especially of a text
written in this time period. It also shows that the Founders were not
“extraordinarily bad drafters,”91 as Justice Souter maintained that
they would be if the non-preferentialist approach to the Establishment Clause had been intended. It shows, rather, that they were extraordinarily good drafters, fully capable of drafting a nuanced,
grammatically accurate text.

3. Grammatical parallelism
Besides resolving the issue concerning the appropriate use of
grammatical articles, interpreting respecting as a verb also improves
the grammatical accuracy of the First Amendment by revealing a
more precise parallel structure. Good writers are taught the importance of parallelism. Parallelism is “using the same pattern of
words to show that two or more ideas have the same level of importance . . . at the word, phrase, or clause level.”92 Usually, “[w]ords
or phrases joined by coordinating conjunctions should have the same
structure,”93 or be parallel. The religion clause of the First Amendment contains two phrases that are joined by the coordinating conjunction or; therefore, the most grammatically accurate version of the
clause would balance the phrases on each side of the coordinating
conjunction through the use of a parallel structure.

91. Id. at 615.
92. Dana Lynn Driscoll, Parallel Structure, OWL PURDUE ONLINE WRITING LAB (Jan.
7, 2012), https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/general_writing/mechanics/parallel_structure.html.
93. Id.
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The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is, without
question, intended to be a participial phrase. The word prohibiting in
the phrase or prohibiting the free exercise thereof cannot be anything
other than a verb in the present participial form. It is interesting,
therefore, that the word respecting in the phrase respecting an establishment of religion has been interpreted to be a preposition, rather
than as a present participial verb as well. Interpreting respecting as a
preposition, resulting in a prepositional phrase Establishment Clause,
creates an instance of faulty parallelism. A prepositional phrase Establishment Clause is not grammatically parallel to a participial
phrase Free Exercise Clause. On the other hand, if respecting is interpreted as a participial verb, the religion clauses become perfectly
parallel—two present participles, prohibiting and respecting, both introducing participial phrases, joined by the conjunction or, equal in
importance, and working together to prohibit two equal but opposite
infringements of religious liberty. It is likely that this more grammatically accurate interpretation of the Establishment Clause is the interpretation that was actually intended.94

4. Rhetorical antithesis
Interpreting respecting as a verb improves not only the grammatical accuracy of the First Amendment, but also the rhetorical appeal
as well. If the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause are
parallel participial phrases, then they constitute a beautiful example
of a rhetorical figure called antithesis. Antithesis is “the rhetorical
contrast of ideas by means of parallel arrangements of words, clauses,
or sentences.”95
Texts written in the EME period and into the LME period are
filled with instances of antithesis.96 Numerous examples can be found
in the Bible, including the following: “A soft answer turneth away
wrath: but grievous words stir up anger.”97 The first clause includes a

94. At least one other scholar has suggested that the two “religion phrases” are in fact
“two participial phrases”; however, he did not perhaps even realize the import of the statement
and definitely did not discuss it. See Oaks, supra note 24, at 3.
95. Antithesis, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/antithesis (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
96. ROLAND MEYNET, RHETORICAL ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BIBLICAL
RHETORIC, 44-53 (Andrew Mein & Claudia V. Camp eds., 1998). See also FREEBORN, supra
note 78, at 390.
97. Proverbs 15:1 (King James).
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noun with a modifier, a phrasal verb, and an object. The second
clause has exactly the same grammatical structure. Finally, the meanings of the two clauses stand in direct contrast to each other. Taken
together, these things create rhetorical antithesis.
If both phrases of the First Amendment are understood to be participial phrases, the First Amendment is also revealed to be a beautiful instance of antithesis. The grammatical structure of the two
phrases is identical. Furthermore, the rhetorical appeal of the parallel
structure is enhanced by the fact that both participial phrases are
equal in importance, but opposite in meaning, each working together
to prohibit a separate but equal type of infringement of religious liberty. In other words, the antithetical means of infringing religious
freedom—granting particular favors to a religion and imposing particular disabilities on a religion98—would be beautifully juxtaposed in
identical grammatical structures. This skillful rhetoric can be seen
more clearly when displayed like this:
Congress shall make no law

Res'pecting an establishment of religion
or pro'hibiting the free exercise thereof.99
It would be difficult to believe that such a skillful instance of rhetorical antithesis in the First Amendment was accidental, especially given
the time period during which the text was written. It is much more
likely that the Founders intended respecting to be a present participial verb all along.

98. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (Johan
D. van der Vyver & John Witte, eds., 1996).
99. The accent marks are intended to make the concept clearer. If respecting were a
preposition, it would be only a functional grammar word, lacking content value. For that reason, it would take no emphasis when pronounced in the clause. Accordingly, per the current
syntactic understanding of the Establishment Clause, all emphasis is placed on the word establishment. Respecting takes no inflection, as it must if it were regarded as a content-bearing
verb. If respecting is a verb, however, respecting would be pronounced with an emphasis equal
to the emphasis on the word prohibiting, and establishment would have only secondary emphasis in the clause, as displayed here.
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5. Drafting of the First Amendment
There is good reason to believe that the Founders would have
made such an effort to draft a grammatically accurate and rhetorically
powerful text. The written history of the drafting of the religion
clause reveals that the Founders carefully considered each word of
their text. They deliberated as well over several seemingly similar
drafts before finally settling on the final version with which we are
acquainted today.
According to the record, on Monday, June 8, 1789, James Madison brought forward for debate drafts of proposed amendments that
he had beforehand “drawn up.”100 His fourth proposed amendment
included the following:
That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4,101 be inserted
these clauses, to wit: The civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience
be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.102

After several weeks, on July 21, the amendments were referred to
a Select Committee, which consisted of eleven people, one member
from each state, including James Madison.103 The Select Committee
reviewed Madison’s proposed amendments, and the religious
amendment was changed to read: “No religion shall be established by
law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed.”104 On August 14, the revised amendments were brought again before a House
committee of the whole for further debate, where they considered alternative wordings. Madison proposed adding the word “national”
before “religion.”105 Another delegate was opposed to this idea, because of the connotations the word “national” carried for the antifederalists.106 Then, Delegate Livermore proposed another reading:
“Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the

100. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 446 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
101. The Annals indicate that after long debate, the delegates at last decided to amend the
Constitution at the end, rather than to replace or add words within the text of the document.
102. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. at 451. The proposed amendment included other text as well,
including the text of most of the other amendments that became our modern Bill of Rights.
103. Id. at 690.
104. Id. at 757.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 759.
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rights of conscience.”107 A move for a vote was made, and the delegates adopted this version of the amendment.108 However, one week
later, the amendment was again changed, for reasons not indicated,
to read: “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.”
109
This version of the amendment was sent to the Senate for consideration and further revision.
The debates before the Senate were not recorded, but the delegates considered at least three new versions of the amendment.110
First, they considered “Congress shall make no law establishing one
religious sect or society in preference to others, or to infringe on the
rights of conscience.”111 Then, “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”112 Finally,
the version agreed upon by the Senate and sent back to the House
read “Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a
mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”113
When the House rejected this version, a conference committee with
members from both houses of Congress was formed;114 Madison was
a member of this committee as well.115 The committee was able to
adopt a version of the amendment that was approved by the House
and the Senate, the version that we know today.
From this short history, it is clear that drafting the First Amendment was no casual exercise. Because there were no records kept by
the Senate concerning the reasons the changes were made that left us
with the current version of the Establishment Clause, it is not possible to know for certain the motivations for choosing the final words.
However, it is clear that the members of the drafting committee carefully considered each word of the amendment, and it is certain that
they would have given careful attention to grammatical and rhetorical
choices,116 as demonstrated in each of their numerous attempts to re107. Id.
108. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. at 759.
109. Id. at 796.
110. CORD, supra note 56, at 8-9.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT 52, 101 (1991).
115. CORD, supra note 56, at 9.
116. This assertion is also supported by the fact that, although before the Bill of Rights
was drafted, during the Constitutional Convention, a Committee of Style and Arrangement was
created to edit and polish the Constitution before it was presented in final form. See John R.
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vise the words so as to more perfectly convey an intention that would
not be misconstrued.117

6. Mistaken understandings
If the fact that respecting should be regarded as a verb is so obvious, some will certainly wonder why nobody has ever noticed the
ambiguity in over 200 years. The answer is simple: given the frequency with which religion clause cases come before the courts today,118 it is easy to forget that between the adoption of the First
Amendment and the early twentieth century, issues involving the Establishment Clause came before the Supreme Court only twice.119
The first substantive Establishment Clause case came before the Supreme Court only seventy-two years ago, in 1947.120 By 1963, just fifty-six years ago, the Supreme Court had still only heard a total of
eight Establishment Clause cases.121 In other words, the Establishment Clause was really interpreted for the first time more than 150
years after it was written.
Following that amount of time, the original syntactic understanding of the clause could easily have been lost, especially given the
changes that took place in the language and in society during that
time. Therefore, when the Supreme Court justices confronted the
words for the first time in 1947, they were free to interpret the
amendment according to nearly any semantic or syntactic interpretation that they found most reasonable. Unfortunately, their initial instinct was faulty, and the less-appealing syntax has been perpetuated
under their influence for the past few decades, as each subsequent
case has built upon the flawed analysis of the last.

Vile, The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787, 48 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 147, 171 (2006).
117. Each previous draft of the Establishment Clause utilizes some variety of verb phrase
and clear and specific language. Never is a preposition proposed, especially not to create the
imprecision created by “respecting.”
118. The year 2012 alone saw about 200 state and federal religion law cases.
119. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50
(1908). In a concurring opinion in Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, Justice Brennan
argued that neither of these cases actually even “raised [or] decided any constitutional issues
under the First Amendment.” Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 246
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
120. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
121. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
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If it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court justices would make
such a gross syntactic error, consider a further mistake of grammar
the justices have perpetuated for the same amount of time. The truth
is that the “religion clauses” are not clauses at all.122 There is no subject and verb in either the “Establishment Clause” or the “Free Exercise Clause.” Together they constitute just one clause. Separately,
they would more appropriately be called the “Establishment Phrase”
and the “Free Exercise Phrase.” The one religion clause is made up
of two phrases: either one prepositional phrase and one participial
phrase, which constitutes an unappealing grammatical structure, or
two participial phrases, a rhetorically powerful alternative.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The question of whether respecting is a preposition or a participial verb might seem like merely a theoretical grammatical exercise
without any important real-life application. However, in fact, interpreting respecting as a participial verb is not only “grammatically
correct,” but it could also be instrumental in resolving many of the
problems that plague religious clause jurisprudence today. That is
because interpreting respecting as a participial verb leads to an important fundamental change in the meaning of the Establishment
Clause. That change could resolve many of the contradictions and
incongruencies inherent in the currently prevailing Establishment
Clause interpretations.123

A. Fundamental Change
As discussed above, if respecting is a participial verb, the Establishment Clause would mean something similar to this: Congress
shall make no law showing regard for a religious organization. In
other words, rather than banning a preference for one religion over
another, as non-preferentialists understand it,124 the Establishment
122. Oaks, supra note 24, at 3.
123. This is not to say that all questions in Establishment Clause cases will be immediately resolved. However, Establishment Clause cases will at least all begin with correct premises
based on an internally consistent and practically workable interpretation of the Establishment
Clause text.
124. The proposed interpretation could admittedly also be construed to support the nonpreferentialist theory. This is the approach that Rodney K. Smith has taken, for example.
Smith, supra note 16. However, I take the broader interpretation of the words that I have advocated here. What is clear is that the interpretation could not support separationism or neutrali-
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Clause would ban respect shown toward any religious organization.125
Furthermore, rather than banning a preference for religion over irreligion, as advocates of separationism and neutrality understand it, the
Establishment Clause would ban respect shown toward any religious
organization. In other words, the ban, clearly prohibiting only respect for any and all religious establishments, would not ban a positive regard shown toward religion generally. This fundamental shift
resolves the logical problems and contradictory conclusions created
by each prevailing Establishment Clause doctrine.
This is especially apparent when discussed in the context of actual
cases. Although Establishment Clause cases have become increasingly
common in recent decades, they can, for the most part, be loosely
grouped into a couple of basic categories126: religious expression cases127 and financial aid cases.128 Religious expression cases involve issues ranging from legislative prayers129 to religious displays on gov-

ty.
125. Further support for the proposed interpretation derives from the organizational nature of religion. Religions lead to organizations. Religion is inherently communitarian and public. Religious believers, almost without exception, form into bodies, and most of these must acquire formal legal entity status to operate in the temporal realm. Therefore, “an establishment
of religion” is not difficult to recognize. Though religions are spiritual and consist of intangible
beliefs, they manifest themselves as temporal institutions. However, all religions are organized
differently, and the temporal institutions manifest themselves in myriad different ways. Therefore, “an establishment of religion” should be interpreted broadly to include any organization
of religious believers.
126. This division of cases is admittedly simplistic, but it suffices for the present argument. Do note, however, that there are a few notable outlier cases. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). These cases also fit nicely within this new interpretational paradigm but are simply not discussed here.
127. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005); McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U.S. 460 (2009); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
128. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd.
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712
(2004); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
129. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway,
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ernment property130 to devotional expressions in schools.131 Financial
aid cases involve questions of providing government financial aid or
other benefits to religious schools132 or other religious organizations.133 The prevailing interpretations—non-preferentialism, separationism, and neutrality—have each taken a different approach to
these categories of cases. However, each has led to confusing inconsistencies and inherent contradictions. The fundamental shift of the
Establishment Clause interpretation proposed here, however, can resolve these problems. The manner in which the problems inherent in
each of the prevailing Establishment Clause interpretations are resolved in the context of both religion expression cases and financial
aid cases by the important shift in meaning when respecting is understood to be a participial verb will be discussed below.

B. Non-preferentialism
Non-preferentialism has never been adopted as a principle for adjudication by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the results that would
be obtained in specific cases, were non-preferentialism to be applied,
can only be discussed as a theoretical matter. Nevertheless, the outcomes of both religious expression cases and financial aid cases under
the non-preferentialist theory seem clear. Given that the fundamental
premise of non-preferentialism is that one religious organization
cannot be favored over another, almost any religious expression—
prayer, a religious display, or a devotional—would be deemed constitutional, as long as a non-preferential stance toward specific religious
572 U.S. 565 (2014).
130. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cty. v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
131. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290 (2000).
132. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd.
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S.
712 (2004).
133. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
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organizations was maintained.134 Likewise, in financial aid cases, nonpreferentialism would likely lead to a permissive stance—financial aid
would be constitutional as long as one religion was not shown favor
over another.
As was discussed previously, the outcome of the nonpreferentialist stance in financial aid cases is problematic. The
Founders felt that one of the problems with a doctrine that allows
non-preferential aid to religious establishments was that it would
force citizens to support creeds that violate their conscience.135 Another problem with non-preferential financial aid, as discussed earlier, is that the financial mingling of religion and government allows
the government to gain control of religious organizations, eventually
leading to the loss of religious character.
The interpretation proposed here would not perpetuate the same
problems. Under the proposed interpretation, though positive regard
could be shown for religion generally, no respect—favors, special
recognition, government assistance—could be shown for any religious organization. In other words, though general religious expressions could be countenanced, aid to religious organizations, such
as monetary assistance, could not. Importantly, a separation would be
maintained between the institutions of religion and the institutions of
government. Such an institutional separation would protect citizens
from being compelled, especially in violation of conscience, to support, financially or otherwise, the creeds of any particular religious
organization. Furthermore, the absence of financial aid to religious
organizations would also protect religious organizations from
becoming subject to government control through the granting or
withdrawing of funds based upon governmental parameters. Nonpreferential religious expressions, on the other hand, those that do
not show respect for any religious establishment, would not
be constitutionally problematic. Therefore, adopting the interpretation proposed here would resolve the issues inherent in the
non-preferentialist interpretation.

134. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31.
135. “A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,” enacted by the General Assembly of
Virginia, January 19, 1786; 12 HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE 84 (1823).
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C. Separationism

The outcome of the separationist theory, as applied in both religious expression and financial aid cases, has been demonstrated in
numerous Supreme Court cases.136 Though confusing exceptions
have been created in cases when the judges were unwilling to take the
doctrine to its extreme,137 the basic outcome is that no religious expressions are tolerated. Likewise, no financial aid is permissible.
However, as discussed previously, some of the problems with a
doctrine that mandates a complete separation between religion and
government are that it is unworkable practically; that it creates hostility toward religion, contradicting the protections guaranteed in the
Free Exercise Clause; that it is difficult to reconcile with the actions
of the Founders, who openly engaged in religious practices; and that
it represents a faulty interpretation of the metaphor that gave the
doctrine its legitimacy. The interpretation proposed here also resolves these problems.
Under the proposed interpretation, the Establishment Clause
does not prohibit all interaction between government and religion,
and general religious expressions would not be problematic. The
proposed interpretation instead makes it clear that separation, especially in financial matters, should be maintained between the institutions of government and the institutions of religion (given that respect cannot be shown for any religious organization), but that
religion in the abstract can be promoted to the end of fostering a
moral people. This understanding eliminates the impossible situation
that judges encounter when trying to reconcile the purging of religion from public society with its practical impossibility.138 It also resolves the contradiction created by the separationist interpretation
with the principles of the Founding Fathers, who openly declared
that religion was necessary for a moral people, and a moral people
were necessary for a republic to function.139 It reconciles the actions
136. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd.
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
137. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
138. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., George Washington, Farewell (Sept. 19, 1796), https://www.presidency.uc
sb.edu/documents/farewell-address (“Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
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of those Founders—declaring national days of prayer, adding “so
help me God” to the Presidential Oath, beginning sessions of Congress with prayer, etc.,140 all of which promote religion generally but
not any particular religious organization—with the words that they
wrote in the Establishment Clause.
Finally, by clarifying that the promotion of religion in the abstract does not violate the Bill of Rights, the proposed interpretation
erases the impetus for hostility toward religion that the separationist
doctrine has created, which hostility contradicts the special favor given to religion in the Free Exercise Clause.141 The proposed interpretation clarifies that religion is valued in the republic, as the Free Exercise Clause implies.142 The proposed interpretation makes plain
that the need for separation between the institutions of government
and the institutions of religion is not due to distrust or dislike for religion, but for the need of religion to be protected from the taint of
governmental influence so that it can be free to flourish—just as
Thomas Jefferson implied in the metaphor that lies behind the separationist doctrine.143

prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. . . . And let us with caution indulge
the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded
to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both
forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”).
140. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 886-87 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675-77 (1984).
141. Oaks, supra note 24, at 2 (“The prohibition against establishment seems to forbid
government support for religion, but the guarantee of free exercise seems to compel the very
same support.”).
142. The alternative syntax of the Establishment Clause proposed here actually leads to a
possible change in the syntax of the Free Exercise Clause as well. Traditionally, the antecedent
of “thereof” in the phrase “or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” has been considered to be
“religion.” However, if “an establishment of religion” is an object of the participial verb “respecting,” then the antecedent of “thereof” could be, rather, “an establishment of religion.”
The Free Exercise Clause would, then, prohibit limitations on the free exercise of establishments of religion, or, more broadly, religious groups or doctrines. This could be more correct
given that the Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the phrase “free exercise” at the time of
the Founding was short for “free exercise of religion.” Therefore, “the free exercise of religion
thereof [of religion]” would be redundant, whereas “the free exercise of religion thereof [of an
establishment of religion]” would not.
143. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom, supra note 47, at 183 (“[I]t is perfectly coherent to hold that the religion clauses require a formal institutional separation of
church and state—or to maintain, in Jefferson’s famous phrase, that the First Amendment
erects a ‘wall of separation between church and state’—without also calling for government to
be sealed off from religious beliefs or prohibited from supporting religious values and
symbols.”).

316

YILDIRIM, FOR PUBLICIATION, 4.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/2019 5:40 PM

A Rhetorical Revolution

287]
D. Neutrality

The outcome of the neutrality doctrine, as applied in both religious expression cases and financial aid cases, has also been demonstrated in actual Supreme Court cases.144 Generally, religious expressions are tolerated only if balanced by non-religious expressions.145
Financial aid may also be granted to religious organizations equally
with secular organizations.146
However, though neutrality was intended to strike a balance between non-preferentialism, where nearly anything is permissible, and
separationism, where nearly nothing is, neutrality actually just perpetuates the problems of both doctrines by allowing financial mingling between government and religious organizations while contradicting the Founders’ approach to religious expressions. In fact, it
may be said that neutrality creates a church-state relationship that is
exactly backwards. Still other problems with the neutrality doctrine
include, as discussed before, that the doctrine itself is not in fact neutral, that it is oftentimes impossible for the government to be perfectly neutral between religion and nonreligion, and that the very mention of religion in the First Amendment seems to advocate a
nonneutral stance towards religion. The interpretation proposed here
provides a solution to all of these problems.
Under the proposed interpretation, there is no mandate that religion and nonreligion be treated equally. Rather, the government is
prohibited from respecting any religious establishment, but religion
in general can be promoted and encouraged. Treating religion with
favor is not a neutral stance, but, as discussed previously, neither is
treating religion and nonreligion equally. The proposed interpretation, instead of rather disingenuously suggesting that the government
can maintain a neutral position between religion and nonreligion,147
makes no pretense of being neutral.
144. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675-77; County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
145. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675-77; County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989).
146. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
147. The fact that religion was specifically singled out in the First Amendment implies
that religion merits special protection as opposed to nonreligion. This must be true given that
“[t]he problem with a definition of religion that includes almost everything is that the practical
effect of inclusion comes to mean almost nothing. . . . When religion has no more right to free
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Taking an unabashed stance towards protecting religion generally
as valuable to society solves the problem of the impossibility of attempting to treat religion and nonreligion neutrally in all circumstances. It also harmonizes with the fact that the very mention of religion in the First Amendment, and the special freedom and
protection afforded to all religious exercise therein, implies an inherently nonneutral stance toward religion.148 Most importantly, as discussed in the previous sections, the proposed interpretation eliminates the problems created by financially mingling religious and
government institutions by prohibiting particular regard for any religious organization. It also resolves the contradiction of purging
religious references and symbols from the public square with the
Founders’ religious actions by clarifying that religion may be
promoted generally.
V. CONCLUSION
The religion clause was carefully written for the intent of protecting religious freedom. However, in spite of the care taken in drafting
the religion clause, scholars and judges have struggled for decades to
settle on a clear interpretation of the role of the Establishment
Clause in protecting that freedom. Each prevailing interpretation of
the Establishment Clause has proven to be flawed, and each has perpetuated a variety of problems. Overall, this has led to a situation in
which the meaning of the Establishment Clause has remained obscured by an incoherent jurisprudence.

exercise than irreligion or any other secular philosophy, the whole newly expanded category of
‘religion’ is likely to diminish in significance.” Oaks, supra note 24, at 8. Consider in this regard
the experience with the Free Exercise Clause. During the Vietnam era, Congress allowed exemptions for conscientious objectors to draft laws. However, in United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Court extended the exemptions to “purely ethical creed[s],” qualifying these creeds as “religions.” In this way, the
Court enlarged the meaning of “religion” in the Free Exercise Clause to include nearly any
dearly held belief. Interestingly, if the same definition were applied to the Establishment Clause
realm, which has, ironically, remained limited to traditional theism, the government would be
prohibited from supporting any belief system or ethical code. This would foreclose all criminal
law, certainly, and nearly all legislation. As things currently stand, though, a religious group is
more likely to be unhindered in their worship by professing to be merely an ethical code, rather
than a theistic doctrine.
148. See, e.g., Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom, supra note 47, at 156-66
(explaining how the justification for the religion clause arose out of religious rather than
secular reasoning).
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However, a return to the Establishment Clause text, and a careful
linguistic analysis of that text, reveals that an alternative syntactic interpretation of the Establishment Clause, an interpretation in which
the word respecting is regarded as a verb, has until now been entirely
overlooked. This interpretation, besides being more grammatically
sound and historically accurate—and thus probably exactly what the
Founders intended—has the ability to reshape, reform, and clarify religion clause jurisprudence. It is time, then, to recognize and accept
this interpretation of the Establishment Clause text, time at last to
understand the rhetoric that shaped the Revolution.
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